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Using purpose-collected survey data from 535 households in 60 different villages of the 
Jhabua district of India, this paper investigates the extent to which rural households 
depend on common-pool natural resources for their daily livelihood. Previous studies 
have found that resource dependence— defined as the fraction of total income derived 
from common-pool resources—strongly decreases with income. Our study uncovers a 
more complex relationship. Firstly, for the subsample of households that use positive 
amounts of resources, we find that dependence follows a U-shaped relationship with 
income, declining at first but then increasing. Secondly, we find that the probability of 
being in the subsample of common-pool resource users follows an inverse U-shaped 
relationship with income: the poorest and richest households are less likely to collect 
resources than those with intermediate incomes. Resource use by the rich is therefore 
bimodal: either very high or—for the very rich households—zero. Thirdly, we find that 
resource dependence increases at all income levels with an increase in the level of 
common-pool biomass availability. The combination of these results suggests that the 
quality of natural resources matters to a larger share of the rural population than had 
previously been believed; common-pool resources contribute a significant fraction of the 
income not just of the desperately poor, but also of the relatively rich. 
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I. Introduction 
Increased recognition that rural households in developing countries depend 
significantly on common-pool natural resources for their livelihoods has led to a 
perception that common-pool resource stocks in effect serve as a public asset for poor 
households, substituting for the private assets (land, livestock, farm capital, human 
capital, financial wealth) that they lack. This, in turn, has raised the policy question of 
whether improved natural resource management can form the basis of poverty 
alleviation policies. Attempts to answer this question have given rise to a growing liter-
ature on poverty-environment interactions (for reviews, see Reardon and Vosti (1995), 
Duraiappah (1998), Horowitz (1998), and Barbier (2005)).  
One thread of this literature (recently reviewed by Beck and Nesmith (2001), Vedeld 
et al. (2004), and Kuik (2005)), has tried to quantify how dependence on common-pool 
natural resources varies with the level of household incomes, where dependence is 
usually defined as the share of overall income derived from natural-resource use. The 
seminal paper in this literature is Jodha (1986), with important recent contributions by 
Reddy and Chakravarty (1999), Cavendish (2000), and Adhikari (2003)
1. A common 
finding in this literature is that dependence on resources declines with income. Based 
on data from 502 households in 21 Indian villages, Jodha (1986) finds that poor rural 
households derive on average between 9% and 26% of their annual income from 
common-property natural resources, while (relatively) rich
2 households derive only 
between 1% and 4% of their annual income from the commons. Reddy and Chakravarty 
(1999), based on data from 232 households in 12 Himalayan villages, similarly find that 
dependence on resources decreases from 23% for the poor to 4% for the rich
3. 
Cavendish (2000), based on data from 197 households in 29 villages in Zimbabwe, 
finds much higher rates of dependency, with poor households deriving as much as 40% 
of their incomes from natural resources and the rich deriving about 30%. On the other 
                                                            
1 Other, much smaller-scale studies include Pasha (1992), Singh, Singh and Singh (1996), Nadkarni 
(1997), Qureshi and Kumar (1998), Beck and Ghosh (2000), and Fisher (2004). 
2 Although we refer to households with incomes at the higher end of the rural income distribution here, 
and elsewhere in the paper, as rich, it is important to note that these households are still poor in absolute 
terms.  
3 Reddy and Chakravarty only report figures on resource use and total income for rich and poor 
households. We have used these figures to calculate resource dependence.  
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hand, Adhikari (2003), based on data from 330 households in 8 “forest user groups” in 
Nepal, finds that dependence increases with income, from 14% for the poor to 22% for 
the rich
4. All four studies also examine the relationship between income and the 
absolute level of resource use, but find no consistent trend: Jodha finds that use, along 
with dependence, decreases with income, Reddy and Chakravarty find an initial slight 
increase followed by a decrease, and Cavendish and Adhikari find an increase 
throughout.  
Although these studies establish some empirical regularities about the relationship 
between natural resource dependence (or use) and rural-household incomes, they 
suffer from a number of shortcomings. One is that none of the studies examines how, if 
at all, the relationship changes with a change in the stock of natural resources. They 
therefore shed no light on the important policy issue of who might gain or lose from 
potential improvements in, or degradation of, the natural resource base in rural villages
5. 
Another shortcoming of the studies is that they examine the relationship between 
natural-resource dependence and household incomes using only simple tabulations, 
without verifying if the reported regularities are statistically significant. Most importantly, 
the studies provide only conjectures—unsupported by evidence from their data—as to 
why the reported regularities were obtained. Reddy and Chakravarty merely note that 
the poor have less land and speculate that this explains their higher dependence on 
forest resources. Cavendish conjectures that the decline in dependence with income 
may in part be due to cash constraints: poorer households are less able to purchase 
food and are therefore forced to collect it from the commons instead. Jodha, in contrast, 
provides a fairly detailed discussion of why poor households may be more dependent 
on commons, suggesting three specific reasons: (1) common-pool resources act as a 
substitute for the private assets that poor households lack—instead of acquiring fuel 
and fodder from private lands, for example, land-poor households can collect these 
                                                            
4 Cavendish (2000) and Reddy and Chakravarty (1999) categorize households as being poor or rich on 
the basis of the households’ total income. Jodha (1986) defines poor households as those that are either 
landless or own less than 2 hectares of land, and rich households as those with more than 2 hectares of 
land. Adhikari (2003) classifies households as either poor, middle wealth, or rich based on multiple criteria 
identified by villagers as important in assessing a household’s’ socio-economic position.  
5 Based on oral accounts of villagers, Jodha claims that the contribution of commons to the income of 
poor households increases with an increase in the stock of these resources. He does not support this 
claim with any data, however.   3 
resources from common lands; (2) poor households have surplus labor that is well 
suited to resource extraction, an activity where labor is usually the only input; and (3) 
returns to extraction from the commons are often not very high, and are therefore 
unattractive to the rich
6.  
Our study, using purpose-collected data from 535 households in 60 Indian villages, is 
able to examine the relationship between rural household incomes and natural 
resources at a greater level of detail, and address these shortcomings. By collecting 
data on village-level biomass availability, we are able to examine the impact of changes 
in biomass on resource use and dependence at different income levels. By using 
regression analysis, we identify inconsistencies with the results of simple tabulations; 
these inconsistencies highlight the limited usefulness of such tabulations. Furthermore, 
we are able to bring information on household characteristics to bear, in order to 
understand why certain trends emerge between resource use, dependence, and 
income. We thereby focus, in particular, on the question of how private holdings of 
productive assets (land, livestock, farm capital, and human capital) affect households’ 
use of the commons, i.e., whether, as Jodha suggests, common-pool resources serve 
as a substitute for the private assets that poor households lack.  
A more technical contribution of our paper concerns the measurement of resource 
dependence. In existing studies, dependence is measured as the ratio of a household’s 
income derived from natural resources in a given year to its total income in that same 
year
7. The typically high variability of household incomes, both from year to year and 
across households, makes this a very noisy measure of “true” resource dependence, 
and also fails to fully capture differences between households that are poor in terms of 
private assets and households that are not. We would argue that, all else being equal— 
                                                            
6 Fisher’s (2004) study is exceptional, in that she does report estimates of how various household 
characteristics affect dependence on forest income in Malawi. Her results lend support to Jodha’s 
conjectures, in that she finds that dependence (1) decreases with goat ownership, (2) increases with the 
number of men in the household, and (3) decreases with the household head’s education. Adhikari (2003) 
reports on how various household characteristics affect resource use, but there is no straightforward way 
of translating these into estimates of how the characteristics affect resource dependence. 
7 Jodha defines dependence on income from commons as the ratio of income from commons to income 
from all other sources excluding the commons. He also uses two alternative measures of dependence on 
the commons, namely the proportion of households of a given income class that use common property 
resources and the extent to which a given household is dependent on the commons for its employment. 
Using these other measures Jodha finds that poor households are more dependent on commons than the 
rich.    4 
i.e., regardless of what happens in any given year—asset-rich households should be 
considered less dependent on natural resources, since their assets serve as an 
additional buffer to potential negative income shocks
8. In this paper, we account for 
private asset holdings by calculating what we call the household’s ‘permanent income 
from various sources’, defined as the flow of income that a household can expect to 
derive from these sources over the long run. For incomes derived from private assets 
(land, livestock, farm capital, financial capital), we calculate this by combining current-
year returns on these assets with the assets’ annualized end-of-year value; for incomes 
derived from natural resources, wages, home enterprises, and transfers, we simply 
extrapolate current-year income. Dependence on natural resources is then defined as 
the ratio of permanent income from natural resources to total permanent income
9.  
Using these definitions of income and dependence
10 we find that, for the subsample 
of households that collect resources from the commons (about 75% of all households 
are in this subsample), dependence does not necessarily decrease with income. 
Instead, we find evidence of a U-shaped relationship: dependence declines with income 
at first but then increases.  
We examine which characteristics of rich households in the subsample drive their 
higher dependence on resources compared to households with intermediate incomes. 
We find, first of all, that households in the top income quartile simply consume more fuel 
and construction wood. At the same time, they do not meet significantly more of their 
consumption through private provision (i.e., collection from trees on their own land) and 
only in the case of construction wood do they meet part of their higher consumption 
through higher market purchases.  
As for the collection of fodder (dependence on which is found to monotonically 
increase with income) here we find evidence suggesting that the rich prefer stall-feeding 
                                                            
8 Jodha (1986) makes a similar observation by noting that “...the CPRs’ role as a cushion during the crisis 
situation...is greater for the poor households, as unlike the rich, they do not have many other adjustment 
mechanisms.” He does not account for this difference between poor and rich in his measure of 
dependence, however.  
9 A different approach would be to use total household expenditures  rather than total income in the 
denominator of the dependence measure, since expenditures are typically less variable, and more closely 
tied to expected lifetime income. We are unable to use this approach, however, because our expenditure 
data cover only purchases of natural resources. 
10 Hereafter, we omit the qualifier “permanent,” treating it as understood.   5 
their animals to grazing them. This, in turn, may be explained by time constraints, as we 
find that the rich tend to have fewer children, and derive a larger share of their income 
from ‘off-village’ jobs, as well as private-and public-sector jobs. Again, however, we find 
that private provision of fodder differs very little between the rich and the poor; the bulk 
of the rich group’s higher demand for fodder is met from the commons.  
Confusingly, when we consider the probability of a household using any common-
pool resources at all  (i.e., of it being in the above subsample), we find that this follows 
an inverse U-shaped relationship with income: the poorest and richest households are 
less likely to collect resources than those with intermediate incomes. The combination 
of these two relationships i) the U-shaped relationship between dependence and 
income for the subsample of 399 collecting households and ii) the inversely U-shaped 
probability of being in that subsample—results in a declining relationship of dependence 
with income for the sample as a whole, i.e., for the 535 collecting and non-collecting 
households combined.  
The very different relationship between i) income and dependence for collecting 
households and ii) between income and the probability of collecting at all, is explained 
by a “bifurcation” in the use of resources by rich households. Rich households tend to 
either collect nothing at all or to collect a lot of resources, and both tendencies are 
stronger than they are for middle-income households.  
When we compare the characteristics of rich non-collecting households in our sample 
to those of rich collecting households, we find that non-collecting households are at the 
top end of the income distribution, i.e., they are among the “richest of the rich,” with on 
average 65% higher permanent incomes than rich collecting households. Some of the 
difference is accounted for by higher incomes from transfers, enterprise, and current-
year income from agriculture, in part offset by the lower (by definition zero) income from 
resource collection. Most of the difference, however, is accounted for by significantly 
higher ownership of land and farm capital.  
Although, as noted above, rich collecting households consume significantly more fuel 
and construction wood than do poorer households, consumption of both drops sharply 
for the very rich, non-collecting households. Although we have no data to confirm this, 
we conjecture that the latter households use purchased fuels (e.g., kerosene) and   6 
construction materials (e.g., bricks) as substitutes.  
Both types of households were found to have similar animal holdings, but although, 
as noted above, rich collecting households meet no more of their fodder demand from 
private provision than do poorer households, such private provision increases sharply 
for the very rich, non-collecting households. The non-collecting rich also tend to be 
more educated, and (not unrelatedly) derive more income from private/public-sector 
jobs than the collecting rich. Lastly, they tend to have smaller families. All these 
observations are consistent with Jodha’s conjectures about what factors drive 
dependence on natural resources. The fact that non-collecting rich households have 
fewer children suggests that they have less surplus labor to devote to resource 
collection. The fact that they are more educated and derive more income from 
agriculture, enterprise, and relatively high-skilled jobs suggests that they prefer to 
allocate their time to higher-return activities than extraction from the commons. And 
finally, the non-collecting households’ higher landholdings appear to act to some extent 
as a substitute for the commons in terms of private fodder and fuelwood provision.  
That said, we find that most rich non-collecting households do spend time grazing 
their animals on the village commons, and in that sense do engage in “indirect” 
collection. Unfortunately, because we have no reliable way of converting time spent 
grazing to a monetary value, we have to consider the relationship between income and 
this form of indirect resource dependence separately from the remainder of the analysis.  
We first consider the relationship between time spent grazing and income for only the 
subsample of households (about 82% of the total) that spend positive amounts of time 
grazing. Time spent grazing is found to increase strongly and monotonically with 
income, but this relationship is explained entirely by the fact that animal holdings 
increase with income in the same way within the subsample. When we next consider 
the probability of being in the subsample, we find that this probability initially increases 
with income, but declines at the very highest income levels. This, too, is explained by a 
similar pattern for animal holdings in the sample as a whole: at the very high end of the 
income distribution, animal ownership drops somewhat.  
When we examine more closely the characteristics of rich households (in our sample) 
that graze their animals compared to those that do not, we find that non-grazing   7 
households are somewhat richer than grazing ones, despite having lower incomes from 
agriculture and livestock. The difference is more than made up for by these households’ 
much higher income from non-agricultural sources, such as home enterprise and 
private- or public-sector jobs. As with the non-collecting rich, the non-grazing rich tend 
to be more educated, and have smaller families. It appears, therefore, that non-grazing 
households have less surplus labor, and prefer to allocate their time to activities that 
have higher returns not just compared to the activity of grazing livestock, but also to 
agricultural activities as a whole.  
Concerning the question of how changes in biomass affect the dependence 
relationships, we find that overall resource use and dependence increases with overall 
biomass availability for all households, at all levels of income. The same is also true  
when we consider only the resources of fuel and construction wood, and examine how 
dependence on these wood resources changes with forest biomass availability. For the 
fodder resource, the effect of changes in grass biomass availability is somewhat more 
complex, and—perhaps not surprisingly—mediated strongly by households’ animal 
holdings. Overall, households with larger animal holdings (which tend to be rich) tend to 
rely more on grazing and less on stall-feeding fodder in areas with high grass biomass 
availability.  
Summing up, and returning to the policy question that motivates this study, our 
findings suggest that, except in the case of particularly rich households, private assets 
do not appear to act as an important substitute for common-pool resources, and the 
private asset of livestock in fact complements common resources. As a result, 
improvements in the quality of natural resources have the potential to benefit a large 
share of the rural population: not just the desperately poor, but also middle-income 
households and the relatively rich.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the study site 
and Section 3 the data collection process. Section 4 discusses the methodology used to 
estimate current household incomes, while Section 5 discusses the methodology used 
to estimate permanent income. Both sections also provide some descriptive statistics on 
these income measures. Section 6 presents our results on resource dependence, 
Section 7, our results on grazing, and Section 8 concludes.    8 
2. Site Description 
The study site for our project is the Jhabua district in the Indian state of Madhya 
Pradesh. Jhabua is an upland in western Madhya Pradesh that is spread over 0.68 
million hectares. According to the Human Development report published by the Madhya 
Pradesh government in 1998, of the total land area, 54% is classified as agricultural 
land, 19% as forest land, and the rest as “degraded” land
11. Jhabua is one of the 
poorest districts in the state, with a Human Development Index of only 0.356, the lowest 
out of 45 districts in the state. Only 26.3% of men and 11.5% of women in the district 
are literate and the life expectancy of an average person is only 51.5 years. Moreover, 
30.2% of the district’s rural population and 41.6% of its urban population is classified as 
living below the poverty line. Agriculture is the main occupation of households, with 
90.6% of the work force employed in this sector (MPHDR (1998)). Furthermore, 
agriculture in the district is predominantly rain-fed. Households in this region usually 
supplement their incomes through livestock rearing and with various products from the 
forests—most notably fuelwood, construction wood, tendu (Diospyros Melonoxylon 
Roxb.) leaves, and mahua (Madhuca Indica) flowers. These characteristics of the 
region—its level of poverty, its dependence on agriculture, and its dependence on 
natural resources (fodder, construction wood, and other forest products)—make Jhabua 
a suitable study site. Moreover, since high dependence on rainfed agriculture, livestock 
income, and supplementary resource income characterize the economies of large parts 
of rural semi-arid India, the results of this study can be plausibly used to generalize 
about areas beyond Jhabua. 
 
3. Data Collection and Sampling Procedure 
Data were collected from 550 households in 60 villages in the district of Jhabua, 
covering the period from June 2000 to May 2001. A random sample of households for 
the survey was generated through a two-stage sampling design. In the first stage, a 
stratified random sample of villages was generated, and in the second stage, a stratified 
random sample of households.  
                                                            
11 Degraded land, in turn, is made up of fallow land, cultivable wasteland, and land not available for 
cultivation.   9 
3.1. Sample of Villages. The village sample frame was comprised of 89 villages in the 
district of Jhabua where the Madhya Pradesh Groundwater Department has (since 
1973) monitored the groundwater level thrice-yearly (pre-monsoon, post-monsoon, and 
winter). There is little reason to believe that the restricted sample frame led to sample 
selection bias: the 89 villages were selected in 1973 simply to ensure that each of the 
district’s micro drainage basins would be represented
12. Furthermore, because each of 
the micro drainage basins is about 100 km
2
, the villages in our sample are well 
dispersed.  
From the sample frame of 89 villages, a stratified sample of 64 villages was selected 
to maximize variability in the forest stock. For the latter, we used data from the Madhya 
Pradesh Forest Department’s 1998 inventory of all forest “compartments” (the smallest 
forest management unit of area) in Jhabua. For each compartment, the inventory gives 
area and total volume of trees in cubic meters. Summing the volume over all 
compartments within a 5 km radius
13 from the center of a village gave us a measure of 
the total forest biomass available to the village as a whole, which we then divided by the 
number of village households. The resulting measure of per-household biomass was 
used as the basis for stratification. Unfortunately, political unrest in Jhabua at the time of 
the survey made it impossible to complete the survey in 4 of the selected villages, 
leaving 60 villages in all.  
3.2. Sample of Households. Household sample frames were constructed for each of 
the sample villages from village land ownership records and from the Madhya Pradesh 
state government’s village-level list of households living below the poverty line (BPL). A 
random sample of households was selected from three strata—BPL, land-poor (owning 
less than 3 hectares of land) and land-rich (owning more than 3 hectares of land), with 
over-sampling of BPL and land-rich households
14. Table 1 shows the actual 
                                                            
12 This information was obtained through personal communication with a now retired employee of the 
Madhya Pradesh Groundwater Department, S.C. Joshi, a geohydrologist, who was involved in the 
selection of these wells in 1973. 
13 By law, villages within 5 km of any given tract of forest have legal rights to its forest products; villages 
outside this radius do not have the same rights.  
14 Note that we used the size of land holdings for the purpose of stratification only and not to define a 
household’s income. As discussed below, we define income comprehensively to include income in cash 
and kind from agriculture, livestock rearing, resource extraction, home enterprises, off-farm labor, 
financial and transfer transactions.   10 
distribution—determined from the household survey—of land owned by our final sample 
of 535 households (15 of the initial 550 had to be dropped because of data problems). 
Only 7% of the sample households are literally landless, while another 19% cultivate at 
most 0.5 hectares. At the other extreme, 13% of the sample households cultivate more 
than 3 hectares, up to a sample maximum of 39 hectares.  
 
Land Owned (ha.)  0   >0 to 0.5   >0.5 to 3   >3 
No. of households       36 (7%)   104 (19%)  326 (61%)     69 (13%) 
Table 1. Distribution of Land Owned by Sample Households 
 
3.3. Remote Sensing Data. In addition to the data obtained through the household and 
the village survey, we relied on remote-sensing images and tree and grass biomass 
measures from sample plots to obtain data on forest and fodder biomass. A total of 42 
plots, of mostly 0.1 hectares, were laid throughout the district in the fall of 2002
15. Care 
was taken to ensure that the sample plots covered different landscape types found in 
Jhabua. Tree biomass and grass biomass data was collected from each of these 
sample plots and used to estimate the tree, grass, and total biomass in tonnes per 
hectares for the sample plots. At the same time two satellite images for October 26 and 
29, 2002 (obtained from the Indian Remote Sensing Satellite (IRS LISS-III)) were used 
to construct the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI)
16 for the sample plots. 
Next, the biomass and NDVI estimates were used to develop regression models that 
uses the NDVI as a predictor of biomass (including both tree and grass biomass) 
(Arroyo-Mora, Sanchez-Azofeifa, Rivard and Calvo (2001)) for three major land 
classifications—grass and young tree plantation, mature but leafless trees, and mature 
trees with leaves. Finally, these regression estimates were combined with NDVI 
estimates for 1995 and 2000 to estimate tree and grass biomass measures for these 
years. The total biomass available to a household was then estimated by summing up 
the volume of biomass that fell within a 5 km radius of the center of the village and 
                                                            
15 31 plots of the 42 were 0.1 hectares in size, another 5 varied between 0.08 and 1.11 hectares, and in 
the remaining 6 plots only canopy cover measurements were taken.  
16 The NDVI is equal to the difference in near infra-red (NIR) and red (R) light reflectance divided by the 
sum of these reflectances, that is, NDVI = (NIR • R)/(NIR + R) and is commonly used to assess or predict 
vegetation biomass from remote-sensing data.  
  11 
dividing it by the number of households in the village.  
 
4. Current Household Incomes 
To determine the extent to which households in rural Jhabua use common-property 
natural resources for their livelihood, we calculate the income that each household 
obtained from seven major sources, namely (i) agriculture, (ii) livestock rearing, (iii) 
common-property resource collection, (iv) household enterprise, (v) wage employment, 
(vi) financial transactions, and (vii) transfers. Income from each of these sources is 
calculated as the difference between total revenue obtained and total input costs 
incurred, where these totals include both market transactions and imputed values for 
non-market transactions. For example, the revenue obtained from common-property 
resource collection includes imputed values for resources collected but not sold by the 
household. Similarly, the input costs incurred for livestock rearing includes imputed 
values for fodder collected from the commons and then fed to own livestock. For income 
sources (i)–(iv), no cost is imputed for a household’s own labor inputs, however; in this 
sense, the incomes from these sources are “gross” incomes
17. 
4.1. Income Definitions. Income from Agriculture: Income from agriculture is defined 
as the difference between the revenue obtained from all crops and crop-residues 
harvested by the household and the input costs incurred for crop production. Input 
costs, in turn, are defined as the sum of wages paid to hired agricultural labor; costs of 
fertilizers, manure, pesticides, diesel and electricity (the latter for diesel and electric 
water pumps, respectively); costs incurred to maintain farm capital (e.g., tractors, water 
pumps, bullocks); rent paid on land rented in; and rent paid for farm capital rented in. In 
addition, we include income obtained from bullocks, calculated as the difference 
between revenues from dung produced by the bullocks (which is sold or used by the 
household for either manure or fuel), and the cost of labor hired to graze the bullocks as 
well as that of the fodder fed to them. We also include income obtained by the 
household from trees on its private lands, equal to the revenues from fuel and 
construction wood, flowers, fruit, and seeds extracted. No input costs are deducted from 
                                                            
17  Were we to subtract imputed own-labor costs from sources (i)–(iv), we would have to add these 
imputed costs to source (v), leaving total income unaffected.  12 
these revenues, as the only significant input used is the household’s own labor. Finally, 
we added any income from the renting out of own farm capital equipment and land.  
Income from Livestock Rearing: Income from livestock rearing is calculated for the six 
main types of livestock found in Jhabua, namely cows, buffalo, goats, sheep, donkeys, 
and chickens. Revenue is defined as the sum of the value of off-springs, milk, eggs, and 
dung produced by the animals, while costs include the cost of labor hired to graze them 
and the cost of fodder fed to them. The latter cost includes the imputed value of fodder 
grown as a crop and not sold, residue from other crops used as fodder, fodder collected 
from village commons and not sold, and fodder bought from the market.  
Income from Common-Property Resource Collection: An open-ended question used 
during the pre-testing of the household survey determined that households in Jhabua 
collect seven main resources from village commons: (i) fuelwood, (ii) wood for 
construction, (iii) fodder, (iv) mahua flowers, (v) mahua seeds, (vi) tendu leaves, and 
(vii) dung. For the majority of households, the income from common-property resource 
collection is the sum of the revenue obtained from these seven resources. The final 
survey also asked households to list “other” resources obtained from the village 
commons, but only in a few instances did income from such resources exist.  
Income from Household Enterprise: Income from household enterprise is defined as 
income from any non-agricultural enterprise operated by the household.  
Income from Wage Employment: The household survey distinguished three 
categories of wage employment, namely (i) in-village casual employment off the 
household’s own farm, (ii) off-village casual employment, and (iii) regular employment in 
the private or public sector. Income from wage employment is defined as the sum of 
cash and in-kind wages received from these three categories of employment.  
Income from Financial Transactions: Households in our sample own a variety of 
financial assets, including deposits at Banks or the Post-office, deposits with women’s 
savings groups, and loans given to relative or friends. They also owe debt to a number 
of sources—women’s savings groups, moneylenders, friends or relatives. During the 
survey year, households earned interest income on their deposits and paid out interest 
on their debts. Net interest income (interest income earned less interest income paid 
out) constitutes the household’s current-year income from financial transactions.   13 
Income from Transfers: Lastly, income from transfers is defined as the sum of cash 
and in-kind payments received by the household from its family, friends, the state, and 
any non-governmental organizations operating in the area.  
After calculating these different components of total household income, we make 
them comparable across households by dividing the income obtained by the number of 
adult-equivalent units in the household. See Cavendish (1999) for a discussion of this 
adjustment procedure.  
 
  Current Income Quartiles 
  Lowest 25%  25-50%  50-75%  Top 25% 
Income from Agriculture  -1325  81  418  2092 
Income from Livestock Rearing  -365  -78  -1  7 
Income from Resource Collection  320  338  513  1001 
     Fuelwood  72  141  149  484 
     Construction Wood  2  16  3  145 
     Fodder  160  114  293  253 
     Other Resources  86  67  67  120 
Income from Household Enterprise  60  140  160  1298 
Income from Wage Employment  613  1142  2063  4971 
Income from Financial Transactions  -1408  -550  -456  -524 
Income from Transfers  159  117  160  1454 
Total Current Income  -1946  1190  2857  10300 
 
Table 2. Current Per Capita Household Income in Rs. by Major Sources and Income 
Quartiles for Whole Sample  
 
  Current Income Quartiles 
  Lowest 25%  25-50%  50-75%  Top 25% 
Amount of Land Cultivated (hectares)  0.37  0.18  0.24  0.35 
Value of Land Owned (Rs.)  30797  13423  18321  35803 
Value of Farm Capital (Rs.)  7437  1861  2332  4650 
Value of Livestock (Rs.)  3211  2441  2587  2657 
Asset Disinvestment (Rs.)  269  41  -72  -976 
 
Table 3. Asset Holdings Per Capita by Current Income Quartiles for Whole Sample 
 
4.2. Some Statistics on Current Income. Table 2 shows the composition of current 
income for the different current-income quartiles
18. The first thing to note is the large 
disparity between the mean current income of households in the bottom three quartiles 
and that of households in the top quartile. The mean household in the lowest quartile 
lost Rs. 1,946 over the course of the survey year (June 2000-May 2001), while the 
                                                            
18 In this table, and all tables reported hereafter, quartiles and means within each quartile are calculated 
after weighting the observations to account for the oversampling of forest-rich villages, and of landless 
and land-rich households within the villages.  14 
mean household in the top quartile earned Rs. 10,300. The large losses in agricultural, 
livestock rearing, and financial income are explained by the fact that the survey year 
was the fifth consecutive drought year in Jhabua.  
Current income from agriculture, livestock rearing, resource collection, household 
enterprise and wage employment increases monotonically across income quartiles: for 
example, households in the bottom quartile incurred a loss from agriculture, those in the 
second quartile made a very small profit, and those in the third and fourth quartile made 
larger profits. Income from transfers decreased from the first to the second quartile but 
increased from the second to the fourth quartile. Similarly, losses from financial 
transactions increased in the fourth quartile after decreasing from the first to the third 
quartile
19. Surprisingly, households in the bottom quartile are not asset-poor. As shown 
in Table 3, these households cultivate more land than households in the other three 
quartiles. Per capita ownership of land of these households is considerably above that 
of households in the second and third income quartiles, though below that of 
households in the top quartile. Similarly, households in the bottom quartile have more 
farm capital and livestock than households in the top three quartiles. In fact, households 
in the bottom income quartile appear to make the largest asset disinvestments, financial 
as well as physical, to make up for income losses
20. 
These findings on asset holdings and asset disinvestment confirm that private asset 
holdings significantly affect the ability of a household to cope with negative income 
shocks, a fact that needs to be taken into account when assessing a household’s 
dependence on common natural resources.  
 
5. Permanent Household Incomes 
Dependence on natural resources is most commonly defined in the literature as the 
ratio of the income from natural resources in a given year to the household’s total 
income in that year. This measure fails, however, to capture differences between 
households that are rich in private assets and households that are not. All else being 
                                                            
19 Information on financial transactions was the hardest to elicit from households and is likely to be 
somewhat incomplete. 
20 Note that asset disinvestment is not included in a household’s measure of total current income, as this 
transaction reflects a change in wealth and not income.  
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equal, households rich in private assets should be considered less dependent on 
natural resources, since their assets serve as an additional buffer against potential 
negative income shocks. As noted above, there is in fact evidence of such buffering 
occurring in the survey year. We therefore account for private asset holdings by 
calculating what we call the household’s permanent income from various sources, 
defined as the flow of income that the household can expect to derive from these 
sources over the long run. For incomes derived from private assets (land, livestock, 
farm capital, financial assets), we do so by combining current-year returns on these 
assets with their annualized end-of-year value; for incomes derived from natural 
resources, wages, household enterprise, and transfers, we simply extrapolate current-
year income. Dependence on natural resources is then defined as the ratio of 
permanent income from natural resources to total permanent income.  
5.1. Definition of Permanent Income. To make our definitions of permanent income 
from private assets explicit, we first consider the simplest case of financial assets. Given 
an interest rate of r%—we use 10% throughout the paper, which is roughly the value-
weighted average interest rate on bank deposits and other types of savings reported by 
all households in the sample—and given private financial assets worth Rs. At at the 
beginning of year t, we assume that the long-run flow of income that the household can 
expect from these assets is equal to rAt per year. Given this formulation, one could 
estimate the household’s permanent financial income as r  times the value of total 
financial assets owned by the household at the beginning of the survey year. This, 
however, would not make use of information we have from the survey year on the actual 
return from financial assets in that year. In order to use this information, we instead 
define permanent financial income as follows
21: 
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where q is permanent income, It is the return on the assets during the survey year, ∆ At 
is the net change in asset holdings between t and t+1, At+1is the value of the assets at 
                                                            
21 Note that we are assuming that the household receives its income at the end of the year and therefore 
we discount current income as well.  16 
the end of the year
22 (i.e., at the beginning of the following year), and rAt+1is the long-run 
flow of income that the household can expect to obtain from these assets. Since  
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and  t t t A A A − = ∆ + 1 , equation (1) reduces to 
 








Note that if It = rAt, i.e., if the return on assets during the survey year happens to equal 
the expected return, then q reduces further to simply equal that expected return, rAt.  
As for permanent income from physical assets—land, farm capital, and livestock—we 
have to take into account that these assets produce income only when combined with 
labor. Expected income from these assets over the long run is therefore equal to the 
sum of the expected return to the capital itself and that to the household’s own labor. 
That is, given an economy-wide interest rate of r%, an economy-wide wage rate of Rs. 
w, physical capital worth Rs. Kt, and Lt units of own labor applied to capital, the long-run 
flow of income that the households can expect from the physical asset is equal to 
rKt+wLt. Again taking into account the returns to physical capital in the current year, and 
net changes in asset holdings during the year
23, the permanent income from physical 
capital is  
 
(4)  







































t t t t t t  
 
 
                                                            
22 Given the sensitive nature of the information, our household survey did not require the household to 
report the amount of jewelry it owned at the beginning of the year. The survey did ask the household for 
information on the net sales of jewelry during the year. Consequently, we have assumed that the value of 
jewelry owned by the household at the end of the year is equal to the amount bought minus the amount 
sold during the year.  
23 Our household survey did not elicit information on the amount of land bought or sold by the household 
during the survey year and therefore we assumed that the amount of land at the beginning of the year 
was equal to the amount at the end of the year.  
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Using equation (2) and the fact that ∆ Kt = Kt+1 - Kt, equation (4) reduces to  
 
 




















  Permanent Income Quartiles 
  Lowest 25%   25–50%   50–75%   Top 25%  
Lowest 25%  0.34   0.23   0.21   0.19  
25-50%  0.52   0.28   0.18   0.07  
50-75%  0.13   0.38   0.34   0.14  
Top 25%  0.01   0.11   0.27   0.60  
  1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00  
 
Table 4. Relationship between Current and Permanent Income Quartiles for Whole Sample  
 
5.2. Relationship between Current and Permanent Income. Table 4 shows that the 
correlation between current-income and permanent-income quartiles is not very strong. 
For example, although 60% of households that fall into the top permanent-income 
quartile also fall into the top current-income quartile, 14%, 7% and 19% of these 
households fall into the third, second, and bottom current-income quartiles, respectively. 
This indicates that income in one particular year may not give an accurate picture of the 
household’s expected long-run income. For this reason, it is important to look at 
dependence in terms of the latter, and not in terms of income in one particular year
24.  
5.3. Descriptive Statistics on Permanent Income. As shown in Table 5, households 
in the lowest permanent income quartile earn Rs.2,402 per capita on average, while 
households in the top income quartile earn Rs.16,202. According to the Madhya 
Pradesh Directorate of Economics and Statistics, the average per capita income in the 
state—for both rural and urban households combined—was Rs.11,244 in 1999-2000. 
Although this figure is not directly comparable to our measures of per capita permanent 




                                                            
24 Cavendish (2000) addresses this issue to some extent by examining the relationship between resource 
dependence and household income in two separate years—1993-94 and 1996-97. He finds that the 
relationship does not change materially between the two data waves.  18 
  Permanent Income Quartiles  
  Lowest 25%  25-50%  50-75%  Top 25% 
Income from Agriculture  1550  2446  3844  7815 
Income from Livestock Rearing  125  184  218  179 
Income from Resource Collection  187  354  490  1136 
           Fuelwood  100  157  198  391 
           Construction Wood  2  2  40  123 
           Fodder    24  72  184  536 
           Other Resource  60  123  68  87 
Income from Household Enterprise   51  144  246  1216 
Income from Wage Employment  597  1466  2087  4630 
Income from Financial Transactions  -243  -227  -446  -131 
Income from Transfers  134  148  250  1357 
Total Permanent Income  2402  4515  6690  16202 
 
Table 5. Permanent Per Capita Household Income in Rs. by Major Sources and Income 
Quartiles for Whole Sample 
 
Permanent income from most sources—agriculture, resource collection, household 
enterprise, wage employment, and transfers—increases monotonically from the first to 
the fourth income quartile. Income from livestock rearing increases from the first to the 
third quartile and then decreases, while income from financial transactions shows no 
clear trend.  
After income from agriculture, income from wage employment is the largest source of 
income for households in all four quartiles. For the first three quartiles, the wage income 
mostly comes from off-village casual employment. Households in these quartiles earned 
about 65-70% of their total wage income from such seasonal migration.  
 
  Permanent Income Quartiles 
  Lowest 25%  25-50%  50-75%  Top 25% 
Income from In-Village Casual Labor  127  274  236  320 
Income from Off-Village Casual Labor  418  1035  1398  1385 
Income from Private and Public Jobs  52  157  454  2924 
Total Wage Income  597  1466  2087  4630 
 
Table 6. Permanent Per Capita Wage Income in Rs. by Income Quartiles for Whole 
Sample  
 
In contrast, households in the top quartile earned the largest share of total labor income 
(63%) from regular jobs in the private or public sector and only about 30% from off-
village labor. In absolute terms, however, households in the top quartile still earned 
more from in-village employment than households in any other quartile and more from 
off-village employment than households in the first and second income quartiles.   19 
As shown in Table 7, the main source of transfer incomes for households in all four 
quartiles was the state, and almost no income was received from non-governmental 
organizations. Households in the top quartile received substantially higher transfer 
incomes than households in the bottom three quartiles. Nevertheless, these households 
are not as dependent on the state as households in the bottom quartile.  
 
  Permanent Income Quartiles 
  Lowest 25%  25-50%  50-75%  Top 25% 
Transfer Income from Relatives  31  33  44  239 
Transfer Income from Friends  0  3  0  263 
Transfer Income from NGOs  2  0  0  27 
Transfer Income from State  100  112  205  828 
Total Transfer Income  134  148  250  1357 
 
Table 7. Permanent Per Capita Transfer Income in Rs. by Income Quartiles for Whole 
Sample  
 
As for income derived from common-property resource collection—the main focus of 
this study—Table 5 shows that the absolute level of such income increased 
monotonically with income. The average household in the bottom quartile earned Rs. 
187 per capita from natural resources (with the majority of this income coming from 
fuelwood and other resource collection), while the average household in the top quartile 
earned Rs. 1,136 per capita (with the majority of this income coming from fodder and 
fuelwood collection). Consistent with the findings of Cavendish (2000), and Adhikari, Di 
Falco and Lovett (2004), use of all resources combined increases with income in our 
sample, although the same is not true of all resources considered individually.  
 
  Permanent Income Quartiles 
  Lowest  25% 25-50%  50-75% Top  25% 
Fuelwood 4.6  3.5  2.8  3.0 
Construction Wood  0.1  0  0.5  1.0 
Fodder 0.9  1.6  2.7  3.7 
Other Resources  3.5  2.7  1.0  0.7 
All Resources  9.0  7.8  7.1  8.4 
 
Table 8. Dependence on Resources (%) by Income Quartile for Whole Sample 
 
In contrast to the findings of Jodha (1986), Reddy and Chakravarty (1999) and 
Cavendish (2000), dependence on common resources does not decrease with income 
for our sample of households. Instead, dependence follows a U-shaped relationship  20 
with income, declining at first but then increasing. This relationship holds, regardless of 
whether one considers the entire sample of households (last row in Table 8) or only the 
subsample of households that collect positive amounts of common resources (last row 
in Table 9). Among collecting households (399 households in all, dispersed across all 
60 villages in the sample)
25 the poorest derive about 12% of their total income from 
natural resources. Dependence decreases to 10% for households in the second and 
third income quartiles and then increases again to 13% for households in the fourth 
quartile. 
For both the entire sample of households and just the subsample of collecting 
households, the U-shaped relationship is explained by a combination of trends in 
dependence on individual resources. While increasing use of construction wood and 
fodder account for the increase in dependence at higher incomes, decreasing use of 
other resources (mahua flowers and seeds, tendu leaves, gum and dung) accounts for 
the decrease in dependence at lower incomes. It is only dependence on fuelwood that 
itself exhibits a mild U-shaped, or L-shaped, relationship with income. At the income 
extremes, high resource dependence of the poorest collecting households is mostly due 
to their high dependence on fuelwood (5.9%) and other resources (4.5%), whereas the 
high resource dependence of the richest households is mostly due to their high 
dependence on fodder (5.9%) and again fuelwood (4.7%).  
 
  Permanent Income Quartiles 
  Lowest 25%  25-50%  50-75%  Top 25% 
Fuelwood 5.9  4.3  4.0  4.7 
Construction Wood  0.1  0.0  0.7  1.6 
Fodder 1.2  1.9  3.8  5.9 
Other Resources  4.5  3.3  1.5  1.1 
All Resources  11.7  9.5  10.1  13.3 
Table 9. Dependence on Resources (%) by Income Quartile for Collecting Households 
 
We now turn from simple descriptive statistics to regression estimates of the 
relationships between dependence on resources and permanent income for our sample 
households. 
 
                                                            
25 Out of our total sample of 535 households, 136 did not collect common property resources, leaving 399 
that did.  21 
6. Econometric Results 
6.1. Use for Collecting Households. We begin by investigating the relationship 
between resource use (rather than dependence) and both income and biomass 
availability for the subsample of households that derive at least some income from 
common property resources.  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   lei_res_c |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lei_tot_c |  -2.289229   1.382308    -1.66   0.103    -5.059436    .4809775 
lei_tot_sq_c |   .1751691   .0860405     2.04   0.047     .0027401    .3475981 
    rs_bio_c |    .180785   .0722943     2.50   0.015      .035904     .325666 
       _cons |   11.77148    5.54238     2.12   0.038     .6642981    22.87865 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Number of obs = 399 
R-squared = 0.09 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 10. Level of Resource Income as a Function of Total Income and Total Biomass for 
Collecting Households 
 
6.1.1.  All resources combined.  Table 10 shows the results of regressing, for this 
subsample, the (log of) permanent income per capita from all natural resources 
combined (lei_res_c) on the (log of) total permanent income per capita (lei_tot_c), its 
square (lei_tot_sq_c), and biomass availability per capita (rs_bio_c)
26. 
The negative (though not significant at 5%) coefficient on income and the positive 
coefficient on income squared suggest that the relationship between resource income 
and total income may be L-, U-, or J-shaped. A plot of the predicted relationship (shown 
in Figure 1) shows that the relationship is in fact J-shaped. Furthermore, the coefficient 
on biomass availability is positive, indicating that higher biomass availability leads to 
higher use. Figure 1 illustrates this by plotting the predicted relationship at two different 
levels of biomass availability—“low,” corresponding to the 25th percentile of biomass 
availability in the sample, and “high,” corresponding to the 75th percentile. 
 
                                                            
26 In all regressions reported in this paper, observations have been weighted and standard errors 
corrected to account for our survey design, i.e., for the stratified selection of villages, the oversampling of 
landless and land-rich households within villages, and the fact that error terms for households within any 
given village are likely to be correlated.  
  22 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between Income from Resources, Total Income, and Total 
Biomass for Collecting Households  
We find, therefore, consistent with the simple tabulation results reported in Table 5 
and also with results in some of the existing literature, that resource use mostly 
increases with income. The poorest households are not the largest users of common 
resources.  
6.2. Dependence for Collecting Households. We next consider the relationship 
between  dependence  on all natural resources and both income and biomass 
availability, again only for the subsample of collecting households. Because 
dependence, our left-hand side variable, is constrained to lie between 0 and 1, we use a  




    d_res    |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lei_tot_c |  -.6504508    .168738    -3.85   0.000    -.9886093   -.3122924 
lei_tot_sq_c |   .0382391   .0102258     3.74   0.000     .0177461    .0587321 
    rs_bio_c |   .0233792   .0105962     2.21   0.032     .0021439    .0446144 
       _cons |    2.84044   .6961727     4.08   0.000     1.445279    4.235601 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnsigma |  -1.830079   .0917664   -19.94   0.000    -2.013983   -1.646175 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Number of obs = 399 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 11. Dependence on Resource Income as a Function of Total Income and Total 
Biomass for Collecting Households  
 
Table 11 shows that the coefficient on income is negative while that on income 
squared is positive, suggesting again that the relationship between resource 
dependence and income could be L-, U-, or J-shaped. Figure 2 shows that the  23 






Figure 2. Relationship between Dependence on Resources, Total Income, and Total 
Biomass for Collecting Households  
 
The regression establishes that the U-shaped relationship between income and 
dependence suggested by the simple tabulation reported in Table 9 is in fact statistically 
significant. Since this pattern of resource dependence differs from the common pattern 
found in the existing literature (namely that dependence decreases with income) the 
question arises as to what explains the difference. To shed light on this question, we 




    d_wfu    |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lei_tot_c |  -.7059765   .3376614    -2.09   0.041    -1.382665   -.0292879 
lei_tot_sq_c |    .040035   .0194335     2.06   0.044     .0010894    .0789806 
    rs_for_c |    .023584   .0122702     1.92   0.060    -.0010059     .048174 
       _cons |   3.151301   1.463224     2.15   0.036     .2189345    6.083667 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnsigma |  -2.218394   .0921574   -24.07   0.000    -2.403082   -2.033707 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Number of obs = 264 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Table 12. Dependence on Fuelwood as a Function of Total Income and Total Biomass for 
Collecting Households  
 
                                                            
27 The figure plots predicted actual dependence rather than predicted latent dependence (which might be 
less than 0 or greater than 1). The same is true of all dependence plots hereafter 
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  Permanent Income Quartiles 
  Lowest 25%   25–50%   50–75%   Top 25%  
Collection from Commons  210  293  471  988 
Sale from Commons  0 0 0  219 
Collection from Private Sources  26 59 53  72 
Sale from Private Sources  21 35 17  19 
Market Purchase  31 11 28  16 
Total Consumption  246  328  535  838 
 
Table 13. Collection and Consumption of Fuelwood by Income Quartile For Collecting 
Households (Rs.) 
 
6.2.1 Fuelwood. As with all resources combined, in the regression of dependence on 
fuelwood on i) income and ii) forest biomass availability per capita (rs_for_c), the 
coefficient on income is negative, that on income squared is positive, and that on forest 
biomass is positive as well (see Table 12). As Figure 3 shows, this translates into a U-
shaped relationship between dependence on fuelwood and income, confirming the 
pattern suggested by the tabulation in Table 9. Moreover, dependence is somewhat 




Figure 3. Relationship between Dependence on Fuelwood, Total Income, and Total 
Biomass for Collecting Households  
 
We find, therefore, that dependence on fuelwood does not decrease monotonically 
with income. Although the poorest households are the most dependent on fuelwood, the 
richest households are not the least dependent. Table 13 suggests that the high 
dependence of the rich on fuelwood can be explained by the fact that they simply 
                                                            
28 The “low” and “high” biomass levels for which predicted dependence is plotted correspond, 
respectively, to the 25th and 75th percentile of forest biomass availability in the sample.  
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consume more fuelwood: total consumption of fuelwood sharply increases between the 
third and the fourth income quartiles. At the same time, rich households do not meet 
significantly more of their consumption through private provision (i.e., collection from 
trees on their own land): households in all income quartiles meet their demands mostly 
from the commons. These facts together lead to a decrease in dependence between 
the first and the third income quartiles and then an increase between the third and the 
fourth quartiles.  
Interestingly, only households in the fourth income quartile sell any fuelwood from the 
commons, suggesting that poorer households do not consider collecting fuelwood for 
the purposes of selling it a productive use of their time. Also, the fact that households in 
higher income brackets rely largely on the commons for fuelwood provision, despite 
their higher land holdings, indicates that the private asset of land in this case does not 
substitute to any significant extent for the public asset of the commons.  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_wco   |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lei_tot_c |   1.192363   .6885918     1.73   0.089    -.1876058    2.572332 
lei_tot_sq_c |  -.0627425   .0374016    -1.68   0.099    -.1376969    .0122119 
    rs_for_c |    .007984   .0075645     1.06   0.296    -.0071756    .0231435 
       _cons |  -5.563433   3.151419    -1.77   0.083    -11.87902    .7521524 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnsigma |  -1.965065   .2518972    -7.80   0.000    -2.469878   -1.460251 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Number of obs = 37 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 14. Dependence on Construction Wood as a Function of Total Income and Total 
Biomass for Collecting Households 
 
6.2.2.  Construction Wood.  Only 37 households in our sample collect construction 
wood from the commons. This likely explains, in part, the low significance of the income 
and biomass coefficients in the regression results for dependence on construction wood 
reported in Table 14. Figure 4 shows that the income coefficients (which are both 
significant only at the 10% level) translate into an inverse U-shaped relationship 
between income and dependence. This is inconsistent with the pattern suggested by 
the simple tabulation in Table 9. There, we found that dependence on construction 
wood decreases slightly between the first and the second income quartiles and then 
increases.   26 
 
 
Figure 4. Relationship between Dependence on Construction Wood, Total Income, and 
Total Biomass for Collecting Households 
 
 
  Permanent Income Quartiles 
  Lowest  25% 25-50% 50-75% Top  25% 
Collection from commons  67  61  446  1281 
Sales from Commons  0  0  0  0 
Collection from Private Sources  136  1  3  1032 
Sale from Private Sources  0  0  0  364 
Market Purchase  0  14  23  3031 
Total consumption  203  76  473  4981 
 
Table 15. Collection and Consumption of Construction Wood by Income Quartile For 
Collecting Households (Rs.) 
 
The discrepancy appears to be driven by two outliers: the two richest households in the 
sample of 37 collect very little construction wood. If these two sample points are 
dropped, the predicted relationship between income and dependence on construction 
wood becomes monotonically increasing in income, and therefore more consistent with 
the tabulation result.  
Table 15 suggests that, as with fuelwood, the high dependence of the rich on 
construction wood is driven by their higher demand. Although much of this higher 
demand is met through higher market purchases, a significant fraction is met through 
higher collection from the commons, and only a small fraction through higher private 
provision.  
6.2.3. Fodder. Only 74 households in our sample collect any fodder from the commons 
by hand, although, as discussed in Section 7, many more graze their animals on the 
commons. Table 16 reports the regression results for dependence on fodder.  
  27 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_fod   |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lei_tot_c |   .1074323   .0440785     2.44   0.018     .0190969    .1957676 
    rs_grs_c |   6.997335   3.780804     1.85   0.070     -.579565    14.57423 
 xxx_grs_tot |  -.7538115   .4153315    -1.81   0.075    -1.586154    .0785314 
       _cons |  -.8206422   .3863552    -2.12   0.038    -1.594915   -.0463691 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnsigma |  -1.669207   .1293915   -12.90   0.000    -1.928514   -1.409901 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_fod   |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lei_tot_c |   .0899779   .0423668     2.12   0.038     .0050731    .1748828 
    la_ani_c |   -.084253   .0740458    -1.14   0.260    -.2326441    .0641382 
    rs_grs_c |   1.957048   4.903549     0.40   0.691    -7.869883    11.78398 
 xxx_grs_tot |  -.1561651   .5524241    -0.28   0.778    -1.263248    .9509175 
 xxx_grs_ani |  -.6900648   .3289601    -2.10   0.041    -1.349316    -.030814 
       _cons |  -.6090471   .3774375    -1.61   0.112    -1.365449    .1473544 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnsigma |  -1.710365   .1471804   -11.62   0.000    -2.005321   -1.415409 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Number of obs = 74 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 




Figure 5. Relationship between Dependence on Fodder, Total Income, and Total Biomass 
for Collecting Households 
 
In the first regression, the coefficients on income and total grass biomass availability per 
capita (rs_grs_c) are both positive, while that on the interaction term between income 
and grass biomass (xxx_grs_tot) is negative. Figure 5 plots the predicted relationship 
between dependence on fodder and income. At “low” grass biomass levels
29, 
dependence on fodder increases sharply with income. However, because of the 
                                                            
29 Corresponding to the 25th percentile of grass biomass availability in the sample, with “high” biomass 
levels corresponding to the 75th percentile.   28 
negative interaction term, dependence is almost constant in income at “high” grass 
biomass levels. Higher fodder collection by the rich, at least at low biomass levels, 
therefore appears to explain some of the upturn in overall resource dependence for the 
rich.  
However, if the (log of) animal holdings
30 
(la_ani_c) and an interaction term between 
that and grass biomass (xxx_grs_ani) are included in the regression (as in the second 
regression reported in Table 16), then the coefficients on both the grass biomass term 
and the interaction term between income and grass biomass become insignificant. The 
negative coefficient on the interaction term between animal holdings and grass biomass 
indicates that, regardless of income, households with larger animal holdings depend 
less on collected fodder in grass-rich areas. As we show in Section 7, the latter appears 
to be explained by the fact that such households switch from collecting fodder by hand 
to grazing their animals on the commons.  
 
  Poor Households  Rich Households 
Collection from Commons (Rs.)  907                     3358*** 
Collection from Private Sources (Rs.)  1340                     1294 
Market Purchase (Rs.)  492                     1239** 
Time Spent Grazing (Days)  95                        70 
 
Table17. Fodder Collection Pattern for Rich and Poor Households that Collect Fodder 
 
  Poor Households  Rich Households 
Income from In-Village Casual Labor (Rs.)  168                       220 
Income from Off-Village Casual Labor (Rs.)  810                      1609* 
Income from Private and Public Jobs (Rs.)  4                      1589** 
Whether Head Attended School  0.2                         0.5*** 
Years of Schooling  4.8                         5.8 
Adult Equivalent Units Per Animal  2.4                         1.7* 
 
Table18. Income and Asset Characteristics of Rich and Poor Households that Collect Fodder 
 
More puzzling is the still positive (though smaller in magnitude and less significant) 
coefficient on income in this second regression, which suggests that the higher 
dependence of the rich on fodder is only partially explained by their higher animal 
holdings. To search for a fuller explanation, we examine other characteristics that might 
                                                            
30 Total animal holdings are defined as the (unweighted) sum of bullocks, cows, buffalo, donkeys, goats, 
and sheep owned by the household. 
  29 
distinguish rich and poor households that collect fodder. In Tables 17 and 18, poor 
households are defined as those that fall in the first or second income quartiles for the 
whole survey sample (i.e., below the median income level), while rich households fall in 
the third or fourth income quartiles. Out of the 74 households that collect fodder, 45 are 
rich by this definition, and the remaining 29 are poor. Table 17 confirms, first of all, that 
rich households collect significantly
31 
more fodder than poor households, even on a per-
animal basis: the value of collection per animal is about Rs. 3,358 for the rich compared 
to Rs. 907 for the poor. However, it also shows that poor households spend more time 
grazing each animal on village commons than do rich households: on average 95 days 
per animal, per capita, per year, compared to 70 days for the rich
32. It appears, 
therefore, that rich households prefer to stall-feed their animals as opposed to grazing 
them on open pastures. This preference may be explained, in part, by time constraints, 
as these rich households have smaller families (see Table 18) as well as higher labor 
income from off-village casual employment and from private-sector and public-sector 
jobs.  
 
6.2.4. Other resources. Resources other than wood and fodder are collected by 301 
households in our sample. The regression results reported in Table 19 and illustrated in 
Figure 6 indicates that dependence on income from these other resources does not 
vary significantly with overall (wood plus grass) biomass availability per capita. This is 
reasonable in light of the fact that dung availability is at best indirectly related to grass 
biomass, and the remaining resources (mahua ﬂowers and seeds, tendu leaves, and 
gum) are derived from very specific trees, which may purposely be left standing when 
other trees are cut down. The results also show that dependence on other resources 
decreases monotonically with income, indicating perhaps that collecting these 
resources is a relatively low-return activity.  
 
 
                                                            
31In this table, and all tables hereafter that report comparisons of means, superscripts *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The underlying tests for equality of means are 
corrected for the survey design. 
32 The survey elicited total grazing hours, which for ease of interpretation we divide by eight to obtain 
grazing days. In reality, of course, hours grazed per day vary. 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     d_ors   |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lei_tot_c |  -.4961931   .1416145    -3.50   0.001     -.779995   -.2123912 
lei_tot_sq_c |   .0276067   .0081583     3.38   0.001     .0112571    .0439564 
    rs_bio_c |    .001499   .0024208     0.62   0.538    -.0033523    .0063503 
       _cons |   2.243534   .6126462     3.66   0.001     1.015763    3.471304 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnsigma |  -2.746475   .1344301   -20.43   0.000    -3.015879   -2.477071 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Number of obs = 301 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 19. Dependence on Other Resources as a Function of Total Income and 
Total Biomass for Collecting Households 
 
 
Figure 6. Relationship between Dependence on Other Resources, Total Income, 
and Total Biomass for Collecting Households  
 
To summarize, although the poorest and the richest households are the most 
dependent on all resources combined (as indicated by the U-shaped relationship 
between overall resource dependence and income), they are not dependent on the 
same resources. The poorest households are particularly dependent on fuelwood and 
other resources, whereas the richest households are particularly dependent on 
fuelwood, construction wood and fodder. Factors that appear to underlie this situation 
are differences in i) consumption (the rich consume much more fuel and construction 
wood), ii) asset holdings (the rich have more animals), and iii) time constraints (the rich 
prefer stall-feeding their animals to grazing them, and do not bother to collect other 
resources).  
6.3. Resource Dependence for All Households. After examining the relationship 
between resource dependence and income for only the subsample of households that 
collect natural resources, we now examine this relationship for our whole sample. Since  31 
26% of the households in our sample do not  collect any resources, our data are 
censored. We therefore use Tobit regressions throughout, and begin again by 
examining resource use rather than dependence.  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   lei_res_c |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lei_tot_c |   6.796619   3.074556     2.21   0.031     .6350714    12.95817 
lei_tot_sq_c |  -.4151841   .1815623    -2.29   0.026     -.779043   -.0513252 
    rs_bio_c |   .3325485     .13216     2.52   0.015     .0676939    .5974032 
       _cons |  -24.44736   13.14673    -1.86   0.068    -50.79399     1.89927 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnsigma |   1.272794   .0511069    24.90   0.000     1.170374    1.375215 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Number of obs = 535 
Number of uncensored obs = 399 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 20. Use of Resources as a Function of Total Income and Total Biomass for Whole 
Sample 
 
6.3.1. All resources combined. Table 20 shows the results for use of all resources 
combined, for all households in the sample. In contrast to the results of the analogous 
regression for those households that collect natural resources (reported in Table 10), 
the coefficient on income is positive while that on income squared is negative. This 
suggests that the relationship between resource income and total income may be 
inversely U-shaped.  
 
 
Figure 7. Relationship between Use, Biomass, and Total Income for Whole Sample  
 
 
Figure 7 confirms that this is in fact the case: in contrast to the generally increasing 
relationship between use and income for collecting households alone (shown in Figure 
1), there is a significant drop in overall resource use at higher income levels when we  32 
include non-collecting households in our sample
33. Resource use does still increase for 
all income levels with biomass availability, and in fact does so more strongly when we 
consider the sample as a whole. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    d_res    |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lei_tot_c |  -.0323666   .0162639    -1.99   0.052    -.0649601     .000227 
    rs_bio_c |   .0261446   .0092525     2.83   0.007     .0076021    .0446871 
       _cons |   .3051527   .1398513     2.18   0.033     .0248845    .5854209 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnsigma |  -1.696314    .092597   -18.32   0.000    -1.881883   -1.510746 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Number of obs = 535 
Number of uncensored obs = 399 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 21. Dependence on Resources as a Function of Total Income and Total 





Figure 8. Relationship between Dependence, Biomass, and Total Income for the 
Whole Sample  
 
Table 21 shows the results for dependence on all resources combined. Note that we 
omit the usual income squared term from this regression, because the coefficients on 
both income and income squared are found to be insignificant when we include the 
income squared term. If only income is included, the coefficient on it is negative and 
significant. This indicates that, whereas the relationship between dependence and 
income was U-shaped for the subsample of collecting households, it is monotonically 
decreasing for the sample of households as a whole. Figure 8 shows the predicted 
                                                            
33 As with all plots of dependence, the figure plots predicted actual use rather than latent use (which might 
be less than 0). 
  33 
relationship for both low and high levels of biomass. Note that the predicted relationship 
not only differs from that of the subsample, but also from what was suggested by the 
simple tabulation reported in Table 8. The tabulation suggested that, even for the 
sample as a whole, the relationship was U-shaped.   
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     collect |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lei_tot_c |   2.268158   .8997071     2.52   0.015     .4651045    4.071211 
lei_tot_sq_c |  -.1483188   .0512512    -2.89   0.005    -.2510286    -.045609 
       _cons |  -7.815103   3.974718    -1.97   0.054    -15.78062      .15041 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Number of obs = 535 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 22. Probability of Collection as a Function of Total Income for the Whole Sample 
 
 
  Permanent Income Quartiles 
  Lowest 25%   25–50%   50–75%   Top 25%  
% Collecting  78  83  73  64 
 
Table 23. Collecting Resources by Income Quartiles for the Whole Sample 
 
6.4. Probability of Collection and Income. To understand the reasons behind both 
these disparities, we estimate the relationship between income and a binary variable for 
whether or not a household chooses to collect any common-pool resources at all, using 
a Probit regression. As shown in Table 22, the probability of collection is found to 





Figure 9. Relationship between Probability of Collection and Total Income for the  
Whole Sample 
  34 
Figure 9 shows that the relationship is inversely U-shaped with total income, consistent 
with the results of a simple tabulation of the proportion of households that collect 
resources in each income quartile (see Table 23). More specifically, poor households 
are found to be somewhat less likely to collect resources than middle-income 
households, but rich households are much less likely to collect resources than either 
group.  
Resource use by rich households therefore appears to be bimodal: they tend to either 
collect nothing at all or collect a lot of resources, and both tendencies are stronger than 
they are for middle-income households. As a result, if we consider only households that 
collect resources, then the fact that the richer of these households collect more 
resources than those with intermediate incomes makes the relationship between use 
and income increasing, and that between dependence and income U-shaped. If, 
however, we add in households that do not collect resources, then the fact that the 
richer of these are less likely to collect resources pulls both the use and dependence 
curves down at high levels of income. This leads to an inversely U-shaped relationship 
between use and income, and a monotonically decreasing relationship between 
dependence and income.  
 
Income (Rs.)  No Collection  Collection 
Current Income from Agriculture  3308                    -5* 
Income from Agriculture  11179               5842* 
Income from Livestock  210                 161 
Income from Resources  0               1802*** 
Income from Enterprise  2769                 305* 
Income from Labor  4750               4560 
Income from Financial Transactions  -148                -121 
Income from Transfer  2066                 942 
Total Income  20825             13490** 
 
Table 24. Income Characteristics of Rich Households that Do and Do Not Collect 
Resources 
 
Asset Value (Rs.)  No Collection  Collection 
Value of Land Owned  88950         39883* 
Value of Farm Capital  13308           4459* 
Value of Animals Owned  3643           3184 
     Value of Bullocks  1252           1634 
     Value of Buffalo  1225             654* 
     Value of Cows    613             516 
 
Table 25. Physical Asset Characteristics of Rich Households that Do and Do Not Collect 
Resources  35 
 
 No  Collection  Collection 
Adult Equivalent Units  5.1                5.5 
Number of Male Members    2                1.9 
Number of Female Members  2.1                2.1 
Number of Children  1                1.6** 
 
Table 26. Household Characteristics of Rich Households that Do and Do Not Collect 
Resources 
 
6.5. Differences between Rich Collectors and Non-Collectors. To better understand 
why some rich households choose to collect from the commons and why others do not, 
we examine a range of household characteristics that might plausibly drive this 
decision. Tables 24 to 30 compare the means of such characteristics between collecting 
and non-collecting households in the top income quartile only. Out of 134 of these 
households, living in 41 different villages in our sample, 86 collect resources and 48 do 
not. 
Tables 24 and 25 show how income composition and asset holdings differ between 
collecting and non-collecting rich households. Rich non-collecting households are found 
to be at the top end of the income distribution, i.e., to be among the “richest of the rich,” 
with on average 65% higher permanent incomes than rich collecting households. Some 
of this difference is accounted for by higher incomes from transfers, enterprise, and 
current-year income from agriculture, in part offset by the lower (by definition zero) 
income from resource collection. Most of the difference, however, is accounted for by 
significantly higher ownership of land and farm capital by rich non-collectors. Table 25 
shows that the value of land owned by rich non-collectors is more than twice as high as 
that of rich collectors, and the value of farm capital owned is more than three times as 
high. 
 
 No  Collection  Collection 
Collection from commons  0            620*** 
Sale from Commons  0            138 
Collection from Private Sources  337            104 
Sale from Private Sources  73              12 
Market Purchase  45              15 
Total consumption  309            589 
 
Table 27. Collection and Consumption of Fuelwood For Rich Households that Do and Do 
Not Collect Resources (Rs.) 
  36 
 
 No  Collection  Collection 
Collection from Commons  0              195* 
Sale from Commons  0                  0 
Collection from Private Sources  40              260** 
Sale from Private Sources  0                55 
Market Purchase  478              498 
Total consumption  518              898 
 
Table 28. Collection and Consumption of Construction Wood For Rich Households that Do 
and Do Not Collect Resources (Rs.) 
 
Although, as noted above, rich collecting households consume significantly more 
fuel and construction wood than do poorer households, Tables 27 and 28 show that 
consumption of both drops sharply for the very rich, non-collecting households. 
Although we have no data to confirm this, we conjecture that the latter households use 
purchased fuels (e.g., kerosene) and construction materials (e.g., bricks) as substitutes. 
There is also some evidence that non-collecting households substitute privately 
provided fuelwood for wood from common-property forests, although private provision of 
construction wood is in fact lower for non-collectors. 
 No  Collection  Collection 
Collection from Commons (Rs.)  0        850*** 
Collection from Private Sources (Rs.)  2937      1508 
Market Purchase (Rs.)  748        627 
Time Spent Grazing (Days)  33          41 
 
Table 29. Fodder Consumption Characteristics of Rich Households that Do and Do Not 
Collect Resources 
 
Table 25 shows that both groups of households have similar animal holdings. 
However, although it was noted above that rich collecting households meet no more of 
their fodder demand from private provision than do poorer households, Table 29 shows 
that such private provision increases sharply for the very rich, non-collecting 
households. 
 No  Collection  Collection 
Income from In-Village Casual Labor (Rs.)  99  450 
Income from Off-Village Casual Labor (Rs.)  1049  1583 
Migration (days)      46      62 
Income from Private and Public Jobs (Rs.)  3602  2527 
Whether Head Attended School  0.64   0.56 
Years of Schooling  9.3  7.7 
 
Table 30. Labor Income and Schooling Characteristics of Rich Households that Do and Do 
Not Collect Resources  37 
 
Finally, although Table 24 shows that total labor earnings are more or less the same 
between collecting and non-collecting households, Table 30 indicates some differences 
in the sources of these labor earnings. Rich collecting households derive more of their 
labor earnings from in-village and off-village casual employment (which tends to be 
relatively low-skilled) while rich non-collecting households derive a greater proportion of 
their earnings from regular jobs in the private and the public sector (which tend to be 
relatively high-skilled). Heads of non-collecting households are also more likely to have 
attended school and, conditional on attendance, to have completed more grades.  
All these observations are consistent with Jodha’s conjectures about what factors 
drive dependence on resources. The fact that non-collecting rich households have 
fewer children suggests that they have less surplus labor to devote to resource 
collection. The fact that they are more educated and derive more income from 
agriculture, enterprise, and relatively high-skilled jobs suggests that they prefer to 
allocate their time to higher-return activities than to resource extraction from the 
commons. And finally, the non-collecting households’ higher landholdings appear to act, 
to some extent, as a substitute for the commons in terms of private fodder and fuel-
wood provision.  
 
7. Grazing 
Thus far, we have considered only common resources that are collected “directly” by 
the household, i.e., by hand. Households also gather one resource, fodder, “indirectly,” 
by letting their animals graze on common grazing lands. Unfortunately, we have no 
reliable way of converting time spent grazing to a monetary value. We therefore have to 
consider the relationship between income and this form of indirect resource 











qa_lbr_lvs_c |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lei_tot_c |   6.327754   2.744904     2.31   0.025     .8268441    11.82866 
    rs_grs_c |   102.2917   24.61553     4.16   0.000     52.96108    151.6223 
       _cons |   -17.4754   23.74671    -0.74   0.465    -65.06488    30.11408 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
R-squared        =    0.14 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
qa_lbr_lvs_c |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lei_tot_c |  -.2287665    3.78143    -0.06   0.952    -7.806922    7.349389 
    la_ani_c |    21.2217   5.079281     4.18   0.000     11.04259     31.4008 
    rs_grs_c |  -202.1219   253.8881    -0.80   0.429     -710.925    306.6812 
 xxx_grs_tot |   25.52679   29.75249     0.86   0.395    -34.09854    85.15212 
 xxx_grs_ani |   75.08664   26.47702     2.84   0.006     22.02551    128.1478 
       _cons |   30.43337    32.0373     0.95   0.346    -33.77082    94.63756 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Number of obs = 438 
R-squared = 0.25 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 31. Time spent Grazing as a Function of Total Income, Animal Holdings, and Biomass 
for Grazing Households 
 
7.1. Households that Graze their Animals. Table 31 shows the results of two 
regression estimates of the relationship between time spent grazing animals 
(qa_lbr_lvs_c) and i) income, ii) animal holdings and iii) grass biomass availability, for 
only those households that choose to graze their animals (438 out of 535 households in 
our sample). In the first regression, time spent grazing animals is regressed on income 
and grass biomass availability alone. The coefficients on both are found to be 




Figure 10. Relationship between Time Spent Grazing, total Income, and Grass Biomass 
for Grazing Households  39 
The second regression adds animal holdings (la_ani_c), and two interaction terms 
between income and grass biomass (xxx_grs_tot) and between animal holdings and 
grass biomass (xxx_grs_ani). In this regression, the coefficient on income is no longer 
significant, indicating that income in the first regression merely proxies for animal 
holdings. The coefficient on grass biomass is no longer significant either, but that on the 
interaction term between animal holdings and grass biomass is positive and highly 
significant. This indicates, as one would expect, that grass biomass availability affects 
time spent grazing only if a household has positive animal holdings, and then more so, 
the more animals the household has. Figure 11 shows the predicted relationship 
between time spent grazing animals and the household’s total animal holdings, for two 




It is reasonable to assume that the amount of fodder gathered indirectly through open 
grazing increases with the time the household spends on this activity. If so, then this 
second regression establishes that the amount of fodder gathered in this way increases 
with the number of animals for a given level of grass biomass. This contrasts with the 
second regression of Table 16, which established that the amount of fodder collected 
directly by the household decreases with the number of animals for a given level of 
grass biomass. The combination of these results implies that, as grass becomes more 
abundant, households with larger animal holdings switch from fodder collection to 
grazing.  40 
7.2. All Households. We now examine time spent grazing for the entire sample of 
households, rather than just the subsample of households for which this time is strictly 
positive.  
Table 32 and Figures 12 and 13 show that the relationships between time spent 
grazing animals, household income, animal holdings, and fodder biomass are largely 
unchanged when the entire sample of households is considered. The one notable 
difference is that in the first regression of Table 32: the coefficient on grass biomass 
availability is no longer significant.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
qa_lbr_lvs_c |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lei_tot_c |   5.910437   3.175544     1.86   0.068    -.4534946    12.27437 
    rs_grs_c |   4.938886   30.76425     0.16   0.873    -56.71404    66.59181 
       _cons |  -17.04274   27.65121    -0.62   0.540    -72.45701    38.37153 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnsigma |   3.676099   .0592996    61.99   0.000      3.55726    3.794939 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
qa_lbr_lvs_c |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lei_tot_c |  -1.573458   3.053436    -0.52   0.608     -7.69268    4.545765 
    la_ani_c |   44.63472   6.759383     6.60   0.000     31.08862    58.18083 
    rs_grs_c |  -145.6695   129.0204    -1.13   0.264    -404.2322    112.8932 
 xxx_grs_tot |   9.301322     14.124     0.66   0.513     -19.0038    37.60644 
 xxx_grs_ani |   131.9558   31.94725     4.13   0.000     67.93204    195.9795 
       _cons |    25.7815   25.18956     1.02   0.311    -24.69951    76.26252 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnsigma |   3.447111   .0486131    70.91   0.000     3.349688    3.544534 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Number of obs = 535 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 32. Time spent grazing as a function of Total Income, Animal Holdings, and 





Figure 12. Relationship between Time Spent Grazing, Total Income, and Grass Biomass 
for Whole Sample   41 
Comparison of Figures 10 and 12 suggests that there is a parallel shift downwards in 
the time spent grazing animals in high-biomass areas relative to low-biomass areas 
when non-grazing households are added to the sample. Underlying this is a puzzling 
tendency (confirmed by a tabulation not reported here) for non-grazing households to 
live disproportionately in high-biomass areas.  
As was true for the subsample of households that graze their animals, the 
coefficient on income is no longer significant in the second regression of Table 31, 
suggesting again that income in the first regression merely proxies for animal holdings. 
As in Figure 11, the positive coefficient on the interaction term between animal holdings 
and grass biomass in the second regression causes the curve between time spent 




However, because non-grazing households live disproportionately in high-biomass 
areas, in Figure 13 the high-biomass curve is also shifted downwards relative to the 
low-biomass curve when compared to Figure 11.  
7.3. Probability of Grazing. We finally consider the relationship between income and a 
binary variable for whether or not a household grazes its animals at all. Obviously, only 
households that own animals in the first place face a choice in this matter. Moreover, it 
turns out that only 6% of such households—30 out of 465—in fact choose not to graze 
their animals at all (i.e., to rely entirely on stall-feeding). Therefore, the binary variable in 
effect mostly captures whether or not a household owns any animals at all.   42 
The first regression in Table 33 reports the results of a Probit regression of this binary 
variable on income and income squared. As shown in Figure 14, the estimated 
coefficients on both imply an inversely U-shaped relationship between the probability of 
grazing and income. This is also consistent with the tabulations reported in Table 34.  
The second regression in Table 33 adds animal holdings and an interaction term 
between animal holdings and grass biomass. Income once again becomes insignificant, 
suggesting again that it merely serves as a proxy for animal holdings in the first 
regression. This in turn implies, however, that underlying the sharp decline in the 
probability of grazing at high income levels must be a similar drop in animal holdings, 
although other factors not included in the regressions may also come into play. 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       graze |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lei_tot_c |   3.092843   1.309848     2.36   0.022     .4678496    5.717836 
lei_tot_sq_c |  -.1764307   .0765604    -2.30   0.025    -.3298612   -.0230002 
       _cons |  -12.55025   5.549006    -2.26   0.028     -23.6707   -1.429788 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       graze |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lei_tot_c |   .9925055   1.329563     0.75   0.459    -1.671998    3.657009 
lei_tot_sq_c |  -.0615588   .0794264    -0.78   0.442    -.2207329    .0976153 
    la_ani_c |   6.121277   .5742403    10.66   0.000     4.970474     7.27208 
 la_ani_sq_c |  -2.331091    .360853    -6.46   0.000    -3.054257   -1.607925 
       _cons |  -4.765572   5.467129    -0.87   0.387    -15.72194    6.190799 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Number of obs = 535 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 





  Permanent Income Quartiles 
  Lowest 25%   25–50%   50–75%   Top 25%  
% Grazing  73  86  88  81 
Time spent Grazing  30  41  45  38 
 
Table 34. Percentage of Households Grazing Animals and Time Spent Grazing by 









7.4. Differences between Rich Grazers and Non-Grazers. Just as Tables 24 to 30 
compared rich collecting and non-collecting households according to various 
dimensions, Tables 35 to 38 do so for rich grazing and non-grazing households. Out of 
134 households in the top income quartile, 108 graze their animals and 26 do not.  
As was true of rich non-collecting households compared to collecting ones, rich non-
grazing households are richer than grazing ones (Table 35), again due mainly to higher 
incomes from high-skilled labor activities (especially enterprise, but also income from 
private and public sector jobs (Table 38)) and higher transfer incomes. However, the 
difference in total income is much less stark, in part because—as expected—rich non-
grazing households own significantly less livestock (Table 36) and earn correspondingly 
less livestock income. The same fact also explains why they demand significantly less 
fodder from all sources (Table 37). More surprising is that non-grazing households also  44 
own significantly less land, and earn correspondingly less agricultural income. Lastly, as 
with the non-collecting rich, the non-grazing rich tend to be more educated and to have 
smaller families (see Table 38).  
 
Income (Rs.)  No Grazing   Grazing 
Income from Agriculture  4014        8983*** 
Income from Livestock       27          226*** 
Income from Resources   859        1221 
Income from Enterprise  4081          335* 
Income from Labor  5787        4274 
Income from Financial Transactions   101         -202 
Income from Transfers  3800          606* 
Total Income  18668      15444 
 
Table 35. Income Characteristics of Rich Households that Do and Do Not Graze Animals 
 
Overall, therefore, non-grazing households appear to have less surplus labor, and 
prefer to allocate their time to activities that have higher returns compared to not just the 
activity of grazing livestock, but also to agricultural activities as a whole. 
Rich non-grazing households own a lot fewer animals (see Table 36) and obtain 
fodder from either their own lands or from the market. That is, these households neither 
graze nor collect fodder from common grazing lands (see Table 37). The fact that they 
have smaller families suggests that these households choose not to get involved in 
labor-intensive activities such as livestock rearing.  
 
Asset Value (Rs.)  No Grazing   Grazing 
Value of Land Owned  27486         67410** 
Value of Farm Capital Owned   3716           8964** 
Value of Animals Owned    711           4166*** 
 
Table 36. Asset Characteristics of Rich Households that Do and Do Not Graze Animals 
 
  No Grazing   Grazing 
Collection from Commons (Rs.)  0   700*** 
Collection from Private Sources (Rs.)  425  2532*** 
Market Purchase (Rs.)  222  810*** 
Time Spent Grazing (Days)     0    49*** 
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  No Grazing   Grazing 
Income from In-Village Casual Labor (Rs.)  856            156 
Income from Off-Village Casual Labor (Rs.)  768          1575 
Income from Private and Public Jobs (Rs.)  4164          2543 
Whether Head Attended School  0.55           0.60 
Years of Schooling  11.4             7.5*** 
Adult Equivalent Units   3.5             5.9*** 
 
Table 38. Labor Income and Schooling Characteristics of Rich Households that Do and 
Do Not Graze Animals 
 
8. Conclusions 
With the goal of better understanding the relationship between poverty and the 
common-pool stocks of natural assets, this paper investigates the extent to which rural 
households depend on common-pool natural resources for their daily livelihood. 
Previous studies have found that resource dependence—defined as the fraction of total 
income derived from common-pool resources—strongly decreases with income. Our 
study finds a more complex relationship.  
Firstly, for the subsample of households that use positive amounts of resources, we 
find that dependence follows a U-shaped relationship with income, declining at first but 
then increasing. (Relatively) rich households collect much more fuel and construction 
wood than poor households, and collect much more fodder, even on a per-animal basis. 
This is true despite the higher land holdings of the rich; provision of these resources 
from private land is, for most households, evidently not an important substitute for 
provision from the commons. In fact, in the case of livestock, private assets are 
complementary instead
34. 
Secondly, we find that the probability of being in the subsample of common-pool 
resource users follows an inverse U-shaped relationship with income: the poorest and 
richest households are less likely to collect resources than those with intermediate 
incomes. Resource use by the rich is therefore bimodal: either very high or zero. 
Comparing households in either group, we find that households with zero use tend to be 
the very richest ones. Moreover, consistent with Jodha’s (1986) suggestions as to what 
factors might influence resource dependence (e.g., availability of surplus labor, access 
                                                            
34 Largely due to difficulties with pricing water, we have been unable to consider how dependence on 
water changes with household incomes. Given that one of the main uses of water is irrigation, however, 
we would expect land to act as a complement to common water resources, which would tend to increase 
the overall resource dependence of the rich.  46 
to higher-return activities, and access to substitute private assets), rich non-collecting 
households are found to have relatively smaller families, higher education, more income 
from public-sector and private-sector jobs, and higher provision of resources from 
private land holdings.  
Thirdly, we find that resource dependence increases at all income levels with an 
increase in the level of common-pool biomass availability.  
Taken together, these results suggest that the quality of natural resources matters to 
a larger share of the rural population than had previously been believed; common-pool 
resources contribute a significant fraction of the income not just of the desperately poor, 
but also of the relatively rich.  
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